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"Thou has committed fornication; but that was in another country and besides,
the wench is dead." CHRISTOPHER MARLOWE, The Jew of Malta.
SINCE conduct of international relations is an executive-legislative responsi-
bility, it has been the practice for United States courts to decide cases involving
foreign affairs in terms of the foreign policy of the other branches of govern-
ment.' When no executive policy is involved, according to conflict of laws prin-
ciples, American courts are governed by the basic public policy of the forum in
cases concerning private foreign rights or foreign law.2 However, in some cases
concerning one or both of these fields, United States courts3 decline making
the policy determination involved and, instead, apply a fixed rule which fre-
quently produces results in conflict with related American values and ob-
jectives.
For example, although the long standing United States opposition to Fascist
persecution4 has seen fruition in destruction of the German government and
* This comment is based on Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr~res Soci6t6 Anonyme, 163
F.2d 246 (C.C.A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 16 U.S. L. WEEk 3108 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1947).
1. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) ; U. S. v, Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 227-34
(1942) ; U. S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 329-30 (1937); U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209
(1882) ; Kennett v. Chambers, 14 How. 38 (U.S. 1852); Williams v. Suffolk Insurance
Co., 13 Pet. 414 (U.S. 1839) ; JAFFE, JUDICIAL AsPEcrs OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1933);
Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory,
55 YALE L. J. 467 (1946); for the point of view that United States courts have sur-
rendered their independence established in the constitutional principle of separation of
powers by considering themselves bound by executive determination of foreign policy,
see Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions, 40 Am. J. INT'L L.
168 (1946) ; see also Borchard, E.xtraterritorial Confiscations, 36 Am. J. INT'L L. 275
(1942), and Jessup, The Litvinov Assignment and the 'Pink Case, Id. at 282.
2. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934); GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
14 (2d ed. 1938); 1 BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 59 (1935); DIcEY, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 25-30 (5th ed., Keith, 1932) ; STORY, CONFLICT oF LAWS 341 (8th ed., Bigelow,
1883), and cases cited therein. Public policy of the forum is expressed in the constitu-
tion, statutes, common law and basic moral customs of the forum, and constitutes a re-
quirement or specification which foreign law must satisfy to be applied. In conflicts
cases in which the defense relies on rights created by foreign law, the courts will refuse
to enforce foreign law which sharply conflicts with the forum's public policy, and will
apply in its place the appropriate law of the forum.
3. While this comment is restricted to the United States rule, it should be noted
that the British rule is substantially similar; see Luther v. Sagor [1921] 3 K.B. 532,
548; Princess Paley Olga v.' Weisz [1929] 1 K.B. 718; Holdsworth, The History of
Acts of State in English Law, 41 CoL. L. Rav. 1313 (1941) ; 92 L.J. 93 (1942) ; 86 L. J.
25 (1938). For continental aspects of the rule see Van Praag, Immunite' de Juridiction
Des Atats atrrangers, 15 REvuE DE DRoiT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION ComPAR E 652
(3d ser. 1934), and 16 id. at 100 (1935) ; De Visscher, Les Gouvcrnements Btrangers cn
Justice, 3 id. at 300 (1922).
4. For a history of this policy including its application in the 19th century see
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abrogation of discriminatory legislation in Germany, American courts ab-
stain from questioning the validity of property rights resting solely on Nazi
racial decrees. This divergence between judicial action and those policies
which would otherwise here be controlling results from the automatic applica-
tion by the courts of an international law principle* granting immunity to
foreign "acts of state".6
Usually phrased as the rule that "the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory,"'7 the doctrine requires that a court decline jurisdiction of litigation
involving private rights created by a foreign state's acts. Despite American
antipathy for the act,8 and regardless of how violent a breach of the foreign
nation's own historic principles is involved, it is stated that private rights
arising out of such acts will not be questioned by United States courts0 This
rule has been applied even when there has been no definite official decision on
recognition of the foreign government 0 or when the foreign government
KOHLER, THE UNTED STATES AxD GERMAN JEWISH PRSECUrION 35 (pamph. B'nai
B'rith 1934).
5. While the rule is generally considered one of international law, it is closely re-
lated to the concept of "public policy" or "ordre public" in conflict of laws. For dis-
cussion of conflict of laws including this relationship see HAranso.i, JuRisPauDuZca: AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1919); CHESHIRE, PrIvAra INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-92 (2d
ed. 1938).
6. "The expression 'act of state' usually denotes an executive or administrative
exercise of sovereign power by an independent State or potentate, or by its duly author-
ized agents or officers. The expression, however, is not a term of art, and it obviously
may, and is in fact often intended to, include legislative and judicial acts such as a
statute, decree or order, or a judgment of a superior court," Mann, Sacrosanctity of the
Foreign Act of State, 59 L. Q. REv. 42, 155 (1943).
7. Underhill v. Hernandiez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
8. "As for the very obnoxious and offensive character of the German decrees, the
court is obliged to hold that governing law is no less controlling because it is bad law."
Kleve v. Basler-Lebens-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft, 182 Misc. 776, 45 N.Y.S2d 882
(Sup. Ct. 1943) ; see McCarthy v. Reichsbank, 259 App. Div. 1016, 20 N.Y.S.2d 450 (2d
Dep't 1940), aff'd inem., 284 N.Y. 739, 31 N.E.2d 508 (1940).
9. See Werfel v. Zivnostenska Banka, 260 App. Div. 747, 752, 23 N.YS.2d 1001
(1st Dep't 1940) ("It is impossible to treat such decrees as violating the law. .. :') ;
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918); Holzer v. Deutsche Reichs-
bahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938).
10. It may be argued that the rule has been applied to governments not even rec-
ognized as de facto; 6 WILLISTON, CoNT.Acrs 5430 n. 14 (Rev. ed. 1933) ("Our courts
accept the actual power of a foreign government to terminate contracts and annihilate
titles within its own jurisdiction in spite of its non-recognition by the United States.") ;
"Non-recognition ... is no reason for regarding as of no legal effect the laws of an
unrecognized government... ."; Salimoff v. Standard Oil, 262 N.Y. 220, 228, 186 N.E.
679, 683 (1933). See also 11ulfsohn v. Russian Republic 234 N.Y. 372, 375, 133 N.E. 24,
25 (1923) (dealing with sovereign immunity from personal suit, when the court stated that
"the result we reach depends upon more basic considerations than recognition or non-recog-
nition by the United States") ; Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F2d 20M,
207 (S.D.N.Y. 1929); Borchard, The Unrecogni.ed Go, erncnt in Aincrican Courts,
19471
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
has ceased to exist."
The actual working of the doctrine is well illustrated in the recent case of
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frres SocitM Anonyme, 12 in which the German
plaintiff's privately owned shipline had been taken in Germany by Nazi racial
decree and sold to the Belgian defendant.13 Normal jurisdictional require-
ments were satisfied since Bernstein, now an American citizen, had attached
the defendant's New York assets in an action for conversion. -lowever the
Second Circuit Court, applying the act of state rule, affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court
denied certiorari.
Speaking for the Second Circuit, Judge Learned Hand appears to have
added a new element to the rule by suggesting that United States courts might
accept jurisdiction over cases involving foreign acts of state if the executive
had indicated conclusively that the courts should so act, but would dismiss
where executive imprimatur was lacking. Since such an exception does not
seem to have been suggested in earlier act of state cases,a'4 which, on the con-
trary, stated the rule as an unqualified inhibition on jurisdiction, it would
seem a partial admission that acceptance of jurisdiction over foreign sovereign
acts is a policy problem.
By contriving this exception, which in its implications undermines the ra-
tionale of the rule, the Second Circuit seemed to mitigate some of its apparent
rigidity. But, by asserting that no clear executive policy had been declared,
26 AM. J. INT'L. L. 261, 268 (1932); Fraenkel, Juristic Status of Foreign Slates, Their
Property and Their Acts, 25 COL. L. Rxv. 544, 555, 568 (1925). But sec Bernstein v.
Van Heyghen Frares Socit6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (C.C.A. 2d 1947), (Clark, J. dis-
senting at p. 253, stating that the rule has never been applied to cases where our Ex-
ecutives had not recognized the government as de facto or de jure.)
11. Banco De Espafia v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (C.C.A. 2d 1940);
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frres Socit6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (C.C.A. 2d 1947);
cf. Nankivel v. Omsk All Russian Government, 237 N.Y. 150, 142 N.E. 569 (1923)
(dealing with immunity of the sovereign from suit) ; Voevadine v. Government in the
South of Russia, 257 N.Y. 557, 178 N.E. 173 (1931) (dealing with the immunity of the
sovereign from suit).
12. 163 F.2d 246 (C.C.A. 2d 1947), cert. denied, 16 U. S. L. WEEK 3108 (U.S. Oct. 14,
1947).
13. For general discussion of legal aspects of property taken in course of Jewish
persecution, see MARX, CASE OF GERMAN JEWS vs. GERMANY (1944), in which the au-
thor holds a "minority" reparations treaty as the only means of restitution, but accepts
the act of state rule unquestioningly. See also JANOWSKY AND FAGEN, INTERNATIONAL
AsPEcTs OF GERMAN RACIAL PoLIciEs 138 (1937).
14. For cases in the Second Circuit stating the doctrine without hint of such quali-
fication see U.S. v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 50 (1947) ; U. S. v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 650 (1947);
Banco de Espafia v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (1940); Hewitt v. Speyer, 250
Fed. 367 (1918) ; The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276, 281 (1920). But cf, infra p. 118, where
it is argued that Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945) admits an excep-
tion to the rationale of the act of state immunities rule where there has been a clear
declaration of executive policy.
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the court was able to apply the rule with full effect and thus avoid a reexamin-
ation of the basic policy considerations involved. However, the tumultuous
events of recent years suggest the need of an analysis of a rule which restricts
courts to a completely amoral attitude regarding foreign acts of state.I5 The
rule is one of judicial invention, unsupported by legislative action. The doc-
trine as applied by United States courts does not rest on ancient precedent; its
continued application is inconsistent with other principles of American law;
and, as illustrated by judicial decisions involving Nazi racial decrees,"' it
gives rise to an undesirable divergence betAveen judicial action and public
policy in matters affecting foreign affairs.
BASIs OF THE CONCEPT IN AMERICAN LAW
Although stated as a fundamental of international law, review of American
cases does not support assertions that the doctrine is a venerable judicial con-
cept. It seems not to have been involved in those cases most frequently
offered to show its long standing; secondly, it does not appear to be a neces-
sary development from the old decisions cited as forming its original basis;
and finally, it appears to rest on an arbitrary presumption made about 1910,
not explained or justified in the opinions.
That the doctrine was not involved in nineteenth century decisions cited
to show its long standing usage is illustrated by consideration of Justice
Marshall's opinion in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,17 which is the earliest
United States holding cited as establishing the rule.' 8 The fact situation in
this case actually concerned the separate principle of a foreign sovereign's
personal immunity from suit, since the American plaintiff was attempting
to prosecute a claim in the federal courts against a warship of Napoleon
which was currently in United States waters. The opinion dealt only with
this latter issue, and Justice Marshall dismissed the action on the grounds that
the immunity from personal suit which would be granted Napoleon if he were
present would extend to his armed vessels.
Review of the reasoning in this decision indicates that the personal immun-
ity of the sovereign which it concerned is not even a basis for the modem
15. Discussion of the rule in legal publications has generally been limited to mere
repetition of the concept without investigation of its logic or history. See Fairman,
Some Disputed Applications of the Principle of State Imnnnity, 22 AIs. J. I;r'it L 565
(1928); K.FsE, PEACE T11ROUGH LAW 82-5 (1944); Comment, 45 YuE L. J. 1463
(1936) ; Notes, 23 VA. L. REv. 288 (1937) ; 17 B. U. L. REv. 102 (1937). But see Mann,
Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 L. Q. REv. 42, 155 (1943) ; Sacl, IWar
Criminals and the Defense of Act of State in International Law, 5 LAw. Gunw REY. 238
(1945).
16. See note 33 infra for a list of cases involving Nazi racial decrees.
17. 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812).
18. See 18 AusT. L. J. 173 (1944) for an Australian writer's attributing of state
immunity doctrines to Justice Marshall; and Mann, supra note 15, for importance of
these American cases in the English rule.
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doctrine. Quoting from Vattel, the opinion rested on the fact that it was
"impossible to conceive"' 0 that a foreign sovereign would send his ships, his
agents, or go himself into a foreign country without an express or implied
promise of immunity from judicial control. While a promise of personal
immunity to the sovereign may be derived from these examples, the modern
act of state doctrine is not a logical sequitur. That doctrine involves the
further proposition that the immunity would extend to rights, property claims,
or privileges which private citizens venturing into foreign states might prove
were originally vested in them by acts of their sovereign.
A second aspect of the Schooner Exchange opinion, generally overlooked
in subsequent cases, was the repeated assertion that the implied sovereign
immunity was not a right protected by authoritative doctrines of international
and constitutional law. It was described as a privilege, resting on a comity
which host nations might .withdraw if such were conceived to be within their
national interest.20 This statement is in contrast with modern cases which
not only extend the sovereign's personal immunity to cover legal claims of
private individuals resting on foreign sovereign acts, but also assert that such
claims are immune from examination in terms of the public policy of the
forum.
21
Upon investigation, other cases cited to illustrate the doctrine's long estab-
lished position similarly appear actually to have involved only sovereigns' im-
munity from personal suit.2 2 The statement of the doctrine most often quoted
in United States cases, and that cited by Hyde,2 Moore4 and Oppenheim
25
as authority in their treatises on International Law, is the pronouncement in
Underhill v. HernandeZ2G that "the acts of the defendant were acts of the gov-
ernment of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the subject of adjudica-
tion in the courts of another government." However, in this connection the
case is a more authoritative citation for the unfortunate results of courts giv-
19. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, at 143 (U.S. 1812).
20. Id. at 140, 143. See also The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 352-3 (U.S.
1822), referring to the immunity granted to foreign sovereign ships and saying ". . . it
was not founded on any notion that a foreign sovereign has an absolute right. . .it may
be withdrawn upon notice at any time without just offense. .. ."
21. ". . . [i]t can not be against public policy of this state to hold nationals to the
contracts which they have made in their own country to be performed there under the
laws of that country." Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 266 N.Y. 71, 90,
193 N.E. 897, 903 (1934). See The Claveresk, 264 Fed. 276, 281 (C.C.A.2d 1920).
22. L'Invincible, 1 Wheat. 238 (U.S. 1816); The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat.
283 (U.S. 1822) ; Dow v. Johnsonn, 100 U.S. 158 (1875) ; United States v. Deikelman,
92 U.S. 520 (1875).
23. 1 HYD, INTERNATIONAL LAw 734 (2d Rev. ed. 1945).
24. 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 30-2 (1906).
25. 1 OPPENHEIAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 115 (4th ed., McNair, 1928) ; cf. § 115 of
the 5th edition (1937) citing later decisions, in turn resting on the dicta of the UnderlW
case.
26. 168 US. 250, 254 (1897).
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ing literal meaning to the careless phraseology of earlier decisions, for "acts
of government" in the present sense were not involved. The plaintiff, an
American citizen, was suing in an American court for damages received in
Venezuela from Hernandez' activities in a local political uprising. Since
Hernandez was acting as a Venezuelan army general, to support its dismissal
of the action, it would seem that it was necessary only for the court to have
cited the "superior orders" concept and to have stated that a sovereign's im-
munity from personal suit extends to those acting under superior orders on
his behalf.
That such decisions do not support the modem rule may be shown in terms
of a hypothetical action for conversion. The Underhill holding dismisses
plaintiff where D1 is a sovereign or agent of a sovereign, because American
courts have traditionally declined to accept such jurisdiction. Now if Di
sells the goods to D-0 (private citizen) it does not follow that plaintiff can-
not sue D2 merely because Dl was beyond jurisdiction of the court. In
order to extend Dl's immunity to D2, we must say that D1 was not only
beyond personal suit, but that any rights related to him lie may "vest" beyond
question in others. The closing of this gap between the present concept and
precedents concerning the sovereign's personal immunity supplies the basis
for the modern doctrine. Although not explained or justified in the cases, the
step appears to have been accomplished by assuming that the basic nature of
governments made the "vested rights" theory a rule of international law.
This type of analysis was exemplified by two opinions of Mr. Justice
Holmes. In the first of these the court denied the right of a Hawaiian to
sue the Hawaiian government, on the "logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority which makes the law on
which the right depends."' 7 It follows, therefore, that property rights taken
by X nation from its citizen A and vested in citizen B cannot be questioned
in X nation. The issue, however, is whether the relative rights of A and B
can later be questioned in Y nation. But in the later American Banana Com-
pany2 case, Justice Holmes without explanation apparently assumed that his
analysis of the rights of A and B in terms of X nation rested on factors so
basic in the nature of governments as to apply by rule of law in Yr nation.
In the American Banana Company case the plaintiff was suing on an alleged
tort consisting of the defendant's incitement of the Costa Rican government
27. Kaiwananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). But sce American Bank
and Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921), in which Justice
Holmes saw no difficulty in supporting a legal right of a private citizen against the
authority on which the right depended. Stating, "But the word 'right' is one of the
most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise
to an unqualified meaning in the conclusion"; Justice Holmes might well have added
that selection of a premise for the judicial syllogism is in essence a policy choice and
rarely a matter determined by mere inductive description.
28. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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to injure the plaintiff in that country. Since no tort existed unless the do-
me~tic acts of the Costa Rican government might be examined in a United
States court with regard to the related claims of private individuals, the case
presented the act of state doctrine in its modern form. In dismissing the
action Justice Holmes stated that the "fundamental reason is that it is a con-
tradiction in terms to say that within its jurisdiction it is unlawful to persuade
a sovereign power to bring about a result that it declares by its conduct to be
desirable. ' 2  For this "fundamental reason" to be pertinent, one must first
assume the answer to the basic question in the case; namely, whether legal
rights and claims vested by one sovereign are beyond question by another.
Moreover, while the holding rests on this unexplained premise, elsewhere
within the opinion are contrary admissions that, in some instances private
legal rights arising from one authority may be questioned by a second au-
thority if required by the latter's public policy.
Although crystallized in the American Banana Company case, the act of
state doctrine was applied to few cases until 19200 when widespread litiga-
tion arose from governmental actions in the course of the Russian Revolution.
In these cases, United States courts uniformly declined examination of rights
created by acts of the Russian government within its own territory.81 Without
investigation or appraisal, the precedents described above were cited as es-
tablishing this immunity, and the modern doctrine was generally adhered to.
Subsequent usage of the rule included its application to rights arising from
acts of the Spanish Loyalist government,3 2 and it currently is given as a basis
for refusal by United States courts to question individual property rights
depending on Nazi racial decrees.m From the above analysis, however, it ap-
pears that at the time of the first Russian cases, the doctrine was not an an-
29. Id. at 358.
30. In Octjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918), and Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918) the doctrine was applied.. Since the Oetjen case did not
concern rights of United States citizens, it is perhaps the earliest holding of the full
modern rule. The only authority cited in these cases for the rule was the Underhill and
American Banana Co. cases described above.
31. Salimoff v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933); Wulfsohn v.
Russian Republic, 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24 (1923); Dougherty v. Equitable Life As-
surance Society, 266 N.Y. 71, 193 N.E. 897 (1934); Nebolsine, The Recovery of the
Foreign Assets of Nationalized Russian Corporations, 39 YALE L. J. 1130 (1930); Con-
nick, The Effect of Soviet Decrees in American Courts, 34 YALE L. J. 499 (1925) ; Note,
20 CoRN. L.Q. 499 (1935).
32. Banco de Espaiia v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (C.C.A. 2d 1940). For
application of the rule to Mexican government acts see Lamont v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 281 N.Y. 362, 24 N.E.2d 81 (1939) ; Stark v. Howe Sound Co., 148 Misc. 686, 266
N.Y. Supp. 368 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
33. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Fr&es Soci&t6 Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (C.C.A. 2d
1947) ; Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14" N.E. 2d 798 (1938);
Werfel v. Zivnostenska Banka, 260 App. Div. 747, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 1001 (1st Dep't 1940);
Kelve v. Basler Le.bens-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft, 182 Misc. 776, 45 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup.
Ct. 1943) ; David v. Veitscber' M.A.G., 348 Pa. 335, 35 A.2d 346 (1944) ; Steinfink v.
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cient and firmly established principle in American law. Its few direct prece-
dents had occurred within the preceding twelve years3 and they rested on an
unacknowledged basic premise in the form of the "vested rights" theory of
law.
INCONSISTENCIES IN APPLYING THE BASIC PRINCIPLE
Although the "act of state" rule has been generally adopted in recent years,
consistent application has not been given to its basic premise that legal status
once vested by the sovereign of the situs is beyond question in other nations.
In closely related situations, adherence to basic conflict of laws principles has
led American courts to review, in terms of the forum's public policyma rights
and claims where legality had been originally established by acts or laws of
foreign states.
According to orthodox doctrine, foreign acts of state are immune only as
regards citizens and their property located within the acting state. That the
rule has never applied to persons or property within the United States 7 seems
a reflection on its rationale, since most of the basic reasons given for the rule
would apply equally to property in the United States, e.g., "comity", respect
North German Lloyd Steamship Co., 176 Misc. 413, 27 N.Y.S2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 1941);
Bollock v. Socit6 Cn&rale, 177 Misc. 136, 30 N.Y.S. 2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
34. In the Bernstein case, supra note 11, at 249, Judge Hand said the rule had been
in force for "at least thirty years." For another indication of the age of the rule, see
section 115 of 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, editions 1 through 4. The 4th ed-
ition published in 1928 contains the first statement of the rule, -while the three earlier
20th century editions do not mention it.
35. RESTATEMENT, CoN-FLIcr OF LAWS § 612 (1934); for opinion on use of public
policy of the forum as a restriction on foreign law see Stimson, Wfhich Lazo Should
Govern, 24 V-.4 L, REv. 748 (1938) (advocating abolition of the limitation); Nussbaum,
Public Policy and the Political Crisis it the Conflict of Lows, 49 YaLE L. J. 10-7 (1940)
(emphasizing public policy limitations where the forum is affected); Kosters, Public
Policy in Private International Law, 29 YALE L J. 745 (1920) (giving history and strong
defense of the doctrine as a sovereign right) ; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and
the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 736 (1924) (discussing its legal basis); Note, 33
COL L. REv. 508 (1933) (listing ways in which the courts have used the limitation);
Nutting, Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine, 19 Mi... L RE%,. 196
(1935) (commenting on the rule from the classical view which held that courts were
bodies which should refrain from policy decisions in the interest of uniformity).
36. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 42 Comment (a) (1934) ("a state has no
power to create rights or other interests beyond its boundaries") ; see also 2 HAccwenrqn,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 165, 393 (1941) ; 2 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 24, at
4, 7; NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-5 (1943) and author-
ities cited therein.
37. It is arguable that in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), the Supreme
Court held Russian confiscation decrees effective against property located vithin the
United States, and that foreign Acts of State accordingly may sometimes have extra-
territorial effect. However, it would seem that the effect given to Russian acts in this case
depended more on the particular provisions of the supporting Litvinov Assignment than
on their status as acts of state. See Borchard and Jessup, supra note 1.
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for foreign sovereigns, avoidance of friction between states. The extreme to
which courts are willing to question acts of foreign states regarding property
in America was shown by their continuing to recognize private property
rights of Russian corporations within the United States long after the Com-
munist government had attempted to confiscate all such property and had
rescinded the laws on which the corporate identity rested.
38
Moreover, there are certain areas in which rights of foreign citizens origi-
nally vested within their own nation under its law have been subject to subse-
quent scrutiny in American courts. Such judicial review has been given in
order to effect public policies resting on long established moral precepts. For
example, United States courts denied some of the legal incidents of marriage
to parties to polygamous, incestuous or miscegenetic 0 marriage contracts
formed under foreign law. Nor will contracts dealing with slavery40 or gam-
bling4 ' be honored, regardless of the law or acts of the sovereign of the con-
tracts' situs.
United States courts have questioned foreign judgments when called upon
to enforce them, although the judiciary is a branch of the foreign government
and its judgments are thus acts of state. The refusal to give validity to for-
eign judgments has included setting aside prize court decisions when proceed-
ings were below a minimum standard required by the United States ;4 restora-
tion of property taken away by foreign criminal proceedings 43 and review of
foreign judgments based on fraud.4 4 It has been stated that in their effort to
support a minimum standard of justice, United States courts will not enforce
any judgment received abroad on an action which could' not have been main-
tained in America.45
Finally there is a growing category of acts committed in foreign nations
38. Second Russian Insurance Co. v. Miller, 297 Fed. 404 (C.C.A.2d 1924) ; James
v. Second Russian Insurance Co., 239 N.Y. 248, 146 N.E. 369 (1925) ; James v. Rossia
Insurance Co., 247 N.Y. 262, 160 N.E. 364 (1928); Sokoloff v. National City Bank,
239 N.Y. 158, 145 N.E. 917 (1924).
39. See Lorenzen, Polygamy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 YALE L. J. 471 (1923);
Recognition of Polygamous Marriages, 1 INT'L L. Q. 64 (1947) ; 2 BEALE, op. Cit. Supro
note 2, at 687, 691 and cases cited therein.
40. Fales v. Mayberry, 8 Fed. Cas. 970, No. 4, 622 (C.C.D.R.I. 1815); 2 BEALE,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 658; DiczY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 25, 532-4; 2 WUARToN, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 1182 (3d ed. 1905) ; STORY, op. cit. stpra note 2, at 342.
41. 2 BEALE, op. cit. sdprca note 2, at 1237; DicEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 630-3;
WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 40, at 1170-83; and cases cited therein.
42. Bradstreet v. Neptune Insurance Co., 3 Fed. Cas. 1184, No. 1, 793 (C.C.D. Mass.
1839) ; 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1364-7 and cases cited therein.
43. Sabariego v. Maverick, 124 U.S. 261 (1888).
44. Schendel v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 168 Minn. 152, 210 N.W. 70 (1926);
Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, 33 F.2d 667 (C.C.A. 1st 1929) ; 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 1401-3; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 535.
45. Di Brimont v. Penniman, 7 Fed. Cas. 309, No. 3, 715 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873); 2
BEALE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1412; DicY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 470; GooDRICUI,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 540.
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by foreign citizens which other states may admittedly measure in terms of their
own policies and law. WXrhile these acts are theoretically limited to acts en-
dangering the prosecuting state,40 acts causing harm in the prosecuting state,4-
or international crimes such as piracy,-'8 they further exemplify that United
States courts may use American law to decide the legality of actions occurring
abroad although such actions may have been approved or supported by the
sovereign of the situs. The conflict between these examples and the legal
theories underlying act of state immunity is evidenced by comparing them
with Justice Holmes' statement in the Anwrican Banana Company case, that,
"for another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat
him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did
the acts, not only would be unjust but would be an interference with the au-
thority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the
other state concerned justly might resent." 40
RECENT DECISIONS CONFLICT WITH ABSOLUTE ACT OF STATE IMMUNITY
Both the charter creating the Nurnberg Tribunal and the actual trial con-
stitute a precedent for an international law concept which opposes the grant-
ing of absolute immunity to foreign acts of state.
In direct contradiction to the act of state doctrine the charter gave the
Nurnberg Court jurisdiction over the domestic acts of the German govern-
ment against its own citizens before the war, and specified that "the fact that
the defendant acted pursuant to the order of his Government . . . shall not
free him from responsibility."' 0 It should be noted that this charter, as a
multilateral executive agreement approved by twenty-three nations, is of high
authority in American courts0 ' and a part of international law. 2 While the
46. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) ; Ford v. United States, 273 U.S.
593, 620 (1927) ; 1 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 763; 2 HACKwormir, op. cit. stipra
note 36, at 179-88.
47. 2 HAcKwonrn, op. cit. mpra note 36, at 188-96; 2 Mfoor., op. d. supra note
24, at 979-84; 1 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 798-SO; and cases cited therein.
48. United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheat. 144 (1820); United States v. Pirates, 5
Wheat. 184 (1820); 2 MooaE, op. cit. supra note 24, at 951-78; 1 HYDP, op. Cit. stspra
note 23, at 767-73.
49. 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
50. Art. 8, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, I NAzt Co.spmAcy Aim
AGGREsSION (Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Crim-
inality, 1946). See also Art. 7 of this Charter stating that "the official position of de-
fendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Departments
shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment"
51. For varying opinions on the status of executive agreements see McDougal and
Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable
Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L. J. 181 and 534 (1945), holding executive
agreements to have substantially the same legal status as treaties; Borchard, Treaties
and Executive Agreements-A Reply, 54 YALE L. J. 616 (1945) and Shall the Executiv
Agreement Replace The Treaty, 53 YALE L. J. 664 (1944) presenting an opposite point
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trial was conducted by an ad hoc international military tribunal and the posi-
tion of the case as a general precedent remains to be established,5 8 it is at least
one instance where international law recognized a minimum level of action
below which sovereign acts will not be immune from foreign review,.4
A further conflict with the doctrine is found in the recent case of Republic
of Mexico v. Hofflnan,55 in which the Supreme Court held that not only was
the granting of immunity to foreign states not an absolute rule of law, but
that it was reversible error for courts to grant such immunity in areas where
the executive had indicated a contrary policy.5G In this case the lower courts
had granted immunity as a matter of law to a Mexican government owned
fishing vessel which Hoffman was libeling in a damage action. The opinion
pointed out that extending such immunity was a matter of public policy, and
that the executive's established policies overrode judicial views on the subject
-that, "it is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our gov-
ernment has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which
of view. In these diametrically opposed articles are listed extensive bibliographical ref-
erence to treaties and case citations.
52. Reference U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 95 (1), December 11, 1946,
reprinted in part in 17 Dep't State Bull. 121 (1947); the U.N. Committee on the Pro-
gressive Development of International Law and Its Codification was instructed to include
principles of the Nurnberg charter in its formulation of an international law code. Ref-
erence Document Presented to the U.N. General Assembly, A236, December 10, 1946,
the committee's resolution stated that the U.N. General Assembly "affirms and recog-
nizes the charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal."
53. Few cases have cited the Nurnberg verdict other than subsequent war criminal
trials. For comment highly valuing Nurnberg's position in international and domestic
law see Jackson, Putting the Nurnberg Law to Work, 25 FoR. AFFAIRs 440 (1947) ; see
also Radin, International Crimes, 32 IOWA L. REv. 33 (1946) ; Jaspers, The Significance
of the Nurnberg Trials for Germany and for the World, 22 NoTRE DAME LAW. 150
(1947) ; but see Wyzanski, Nurnberg in Retrospect, 178 ATL. MONTHLY 56 (1946).
54. See 1 Law Reports of Trials, U.N. War Crimes Commission (1947) for details
of further application of the charter principles by'the prosecuting nations. Over 24,000
persons had been tried for war crimes in Europe under the charter principles by De-
cember 1, 1946; 1 INT'L L. Q. 42 (1947) ; and trials are continuing In each of the four
prosecuting nations.
55. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
56. Reaction to this case was generally favorable, see Notes, 34 CALIP. L. REV. 441
(1946), 45 CoL L. REv. 80 (1945) ; 30 MiNN. L. Rrv. 207 (1946), But see Jdssup, Has
the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions, 40 Am. J. I L L. 168 (1946), sug-
gesting that courts have erred in relinquishing areas of discretion to the executive branch.
Without considering that issue, it is sufficient to note that the granting of immunity was
recognized as a policy problem. Where application of the act of state rule with its auto-
matic extension of immunity would produce results at variance with American business
interests, some courts have been inspired to avoid extending immunity by setting up defi-
nitions of acts of state which would exclude many sovereign acts. 'or an article illustrat-
ing such attempts and their failure to realize that the basic issue is one of policy, see
Fox, Competence of Courts in Regard to 'Non-sovereign Acts' of Foreign States, 35 AM.
J.'IN ' L. 632 (1941).
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the government has not seen fit to recognize. ' 7 Thus, even regarding foreign
sovereign vessels, American courts now recognize that extension of immunity
is a policy matter.
POSITION OF THE CONCEPT IN INTERNATIONAL RE..LATIONS
An objective appraisal s of international relations would seem to highlight
the inconsistency in American foreign policy implementation which the courts'
application of the act of state immunity rule produces. Viewed realistically,
international relations would seem to be the process by which members of the
world community seek across national boundaries such representative values
as power, wealth, knowledge, respect and wellbeing, and use any one or all of
these values to affect the production and distribution of any one or all of
them. And the implementation of foreign policy may best be described as the
use of -national power and other resources for the fullest achievement of
values in interactions with other nations. Thus, to one interested in a rational
international policy, any exercise by a national government of official power
which affects one of these values in a foreign nation is a concern of interna-
tional relations.
An analysis of recent German-American relations in these terms would
seem to point up the actual consequences of the act of state immunity doctrine.
The'United States' declaration of disapproval of the first Nazi anti-Jewish
actions in 193359 was an attempted use by the United States of respect as a
base value to affect German conscience and thus to influence Germany's accord-
ing of respect, in the sense of equal access to all values, to its own citizens. Our
later protests and the recall of the American ambassador in 1938, in response
to further German persecution, 0 had the added intent and effect of decreasing
respect for Germany among other nations. As Nazi actions became more
adverse to American foreign policy, the United States used its wealth to
oppose Nazi wealth and power through such actions as government restric-
tions on trade with Germany and finally by lend-lease to her enemies. The
President used his power to oppose German wealth-seeking by freezing
American assets of German-conquered states.0 ' With the advent of war, the
57. 324 U.S. 30, at 35.
58. The analytical system employed in this section is in great part derived from
that developed by Professors Lasswell and McDougal. For a more detailed exposition
of the method of analysis, see Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and The Public
Policy, 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943); McDougal, Speech, at May 1947 Meeting of Ameri-
can Society of International Law, reprinted in Proceedings of American Society of In-
ternational Law (1947).
59. Dep't State Press Release, No. 187, at 294; No. 183, at 201-3; No. 182, at
196 (1933); No. 305, at 99 (1935). See also ADLER AND MARGALITH, AaI-RICAiN IN-
TERcEssION ON BEHALF OF JEWs IN THE DIPLOMATIC C 0PRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 349-84 (1943).
60. Peace and War (Dep't State) 60, 439 (1943).
61. Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 FzD. REG. 1400 (1940).
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United States added physical power to its other resources in implementing its
foreign policy.
In terms of this analysis, the act of state doctrine as applied by our courts
constitutes a completely contradictory use of one branch of American govern-
mental power to support Nazi conversion of Jewish assets into wealth re-
quired for its plans. It was a use of American authoritative power to support
Nazi goal-seeking at a time when all other American resources were being
marshalled against the Germans. To assert that the policy was merely neutral,
or that it prevented courts from being involved in political problems, would
appear to rest on a failure to note the functional equivalency of inaction and
action in terms of policy consequences.
From the perspective of its actual results, refusal of an American court to
question a property transaction fostered by a Nazi racial decree can scarcely
be described as neutral. On the contrary, its effect is to marshal to the de-
fense of such property the full societal protection of American courts, police
facilities, fire departments, and other governmental agencies. It is thus as
effective support for the decree as that given by a German court. Whether or
not such support is to be given is a policy question and accordingly should not
depend on a narrow rule of law. As a major decision regarding the degree to
which the United States will use its power in affecting basic moral principles,
the courts should make this decision in the light of that policy decreed by the
legislature or executive, or in the absence of official statements, in the light of
its own best conceptions of the public policy of the forum.
ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING THE CONCEPT
One of the arguments most frequently advanced to support the doctrine is
that it rests on the "comity" or courtesy among nations.0 2 This defense would
seem to indicate that courts *have not understood their function of looking to
forum public policy in cases involving international relations. That extensions
of "comity" should be a matter of policy and not of automatic judicial rule is
suggested by the recent anomalous extension of comity by the courts to one
government which the executive refused officially to recognize, and to others
which had ceased to exist.63 The position seems untenable when the courts
persist in automatically extending "comity" to a government which the United
States has destroyed and whose laws we have abrogated.0
62. U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937) ("It rests at last upon the highest
considerations of international comity...."); Hewitt v. Speyer, 250 Fed. 367 (C.C.A.
2d 1918).
63. For examples of cases where the court applied the doctrine to governments
which had not been officially recognized, see note 10 and to governments which had
ceased to exist, see note 11 supra.
64. Paragraph 2, U.S. Zone Law No. 52, Military Government Gazette, Issue A
(June 1946) ; Article 1, Law No. 1, Official Gazette of Allied Control Council for Ger-
many No. 1 (Oct. 1945), freezing all property taken under racial decrees, abrogating the
decrees and providing that rights based thereon shall not be respected. All major nations
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Since, in the geometry of classic international law, the absolute independ-
ence and perfect equality of each sovereignty is a basic proposition, it may be
argued that abandoning the act of state immunity would violate its corollary
that no nation has the right to "intervene" in the domestic affairs of another.0
However, this argument dissolves upon careful analysis of the actual nature
of international intercourse. As pointed out above, any transaction between
nations which involves a use of their respective resources and affects the ex-
tent to which they can achieve their basic values is intervention. If this
analysis is correct, then the support given by United States courts to foreign
acts of state is intervention in so far as it lends American power to support
foreign wealth transactions and adds the respect of the United States to inter-
national respect for the foreign nation concerned. Thus, abandoning the act
of state doctrine, while it may not harmonize with the classic international law
concept of sovereign states existing free from interaction or mutual inter-
vention, is merely an application of the principle that use of United States
governmental power to intervene in foreign national affairs is a policy prob-
lem requiring integration in the whole of national policy.
A closely related reason often given for the doctrine is that the judging of
one nation's acts by the courts of another would "vex the peace of nations."'co
The anomaly resulting from the courts' unquestioned adherence to this rea-
soning is illustrated by judicial action on Nazi racial decrees where it appears
that, in order to avoid vexing the peace, courts will not judge acts of a for-
eign government when it has been destroyed in war by their own nation. As
suggested by the fact that the political branch of the United States govern-
ment controls recognition of foreign governments and declarations of war,
actions taken concerning the peace of nations would seem to be a matter of
policy and should not be subject to an inflexible legal rule.
Requiring the courts to make a policy decision as to whether rights created
by act of a foreign state will be respected in a given case would seem to pre-
sent no serious administrative problem. In litigation involving a right resting
on a foreign state's act, the official executive position would control the im-
munity to be given,G with the policy of the forum being effective within these
broad limits. When no executive views had been established, the immunity
would depend on basic principles of the forum, or on a specific executive
have denounced these decrees and announced that property rights resting thereon would
not be honored; see Inter-Allied Declaration of London, 5 January 1943, reprinted in 8
DEP'T STATE BuLL. 21 (1943) ; for acts of individual governments in exile see Gov=rn-
SmENTS-IN-ExILE ON JEWIsH RIGHTS, pamph. American Jewish Committee (1942).
65. 1 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 23, at § 218. But cf. Radin, Alratioal Sovcrci9nty and
Natimml Individuality, 2 JouRN. oF LEGAL AND POL. Socioi. 5 (1943).
66. U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937) ; Shapleigh v. Mier, 83 F.2d 673, 676
(C.CA.Sth 1936); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
67. See Russian Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 259; 139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923),
when the court said ". . . the rule of comity is our only guide. This rule is always
subject to one consideration. There may be no yielding if to yield is inconsistent with
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statement, obtained as at present.in the manner established by the Supreme
Court in Ex parte Mir.08 Under the procedure outlined in the Muir case,
each of the contesting parties would be able to raise the immunity issue by
obtaining an official statement from the State Department, or by encouraging
the Executive to set forth appropriate suggestions to the court through the
Attorney General or some other law officer under his direction.
It has been argued that submitting foreign acts of state to the test of United
States policy would constitute a judicial arrogation of executive functions 9
and would embarrass the executive. 70 Neither of these objections, however,
seems valid.71 Bringing United States court decisions into harmony with
national policy is hardly an arrogation of executive power. On the contrary
the present judicial practice of granting unquestioned act of state immunity
when the executive has not spoken appears to be an abdication of the judicial
function of safeguarding public policy within the limits established, and when
the executive has set a definite policy it appears to be a denial of executive
control over foreign affairs.
It is difficult to perceive how abandoning the doctrine would embarrass the
executive since in each instance the court would either be following an offi-
cially announced government policy or would be enforcing a forum policy,
subject to discretionary modification by executive intervention as outlined in
Ex parte Muir.72 On the other hand, embarrassment results from the present
doctrine. For example, in recent discussions with Russia the United States
indicated officially that it believed that property taken through racial decrees
by the Nazi government should be returned to original owners and thus not be
considered subject to reparation claims.73 'The pronouncement by United
States courts that title to such property vests beyond question as a complete
our public policy .... Such public policy may be interpreted by the courts, It is fixed
by general usage and morality or by executive or legislative declaration." See articles
cited note 1 supra for comment on the degree to -which the political branches should con-
trol the courts in cases concerning international policy.
68. 254 U.S. 522 (1921) ; for discussion of this procedure see Compania Espailola de
Navegacion Maritima vi The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938); and Notes, 25 Am. J.
INT'L L. 83 (1931), 45 COL. L. REv. 80 (1945), and 50 YALE L. J. 1088 (1941).
69. Oetlen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ; Earn Line S.S. Co. v.
Sutherland, 254 Fed. 126, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); The Gul Djemal, 296 Fed. 563, 567
(S.D.N.Y. 1921).
70. Jessup, supra note 56, at 169.
71. For discussion of the judiciary's relation to action by; the political branch, mainly
focussed on recognition of foreign governments, see Comment, 41 COL. L. REv. 1072
(1941) ; D~ak, The Plea of Sovereign Timunity in the New York Court of Appeals, 40
CoL. L. REv. 453 (1940). However, the rule should be considered apart from issues of
recognition. Recognition is merely one indication of executive policy; it does not consti-
tute approval of 100% of the recognized government's acts; see Borchard, supra note 10.
72. See note 68 supra.
73. Statements by Secretary of State Marshall, reprinted in 16 DFr'" STATE BULL.
793 (1947) ; Id. at 653.
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transfer as an act of the German state is an embarrassing divergence of gov-
ernmental opinion on the international law relating to this question.
Abandonment of absolute act of state immunity would occasionally result
in the property claims of private citizens being respected in some nations and
not in others.7 Such a situation is undesirable because it makes property
transactions non-uniform and insecure. Since escape from these evils inspired
some of the most fruitful developments in conflict of laws doctrine, it is not
surprising that many treatises in the conflicts field oppose judicial discretion
in honoring foreign laws and thus provide strong support for the act of state
rule.7 5 However, it should be noted that such arguments evolved in the rela-
tive stability of the past when modern exigencies could not be anticipated, and
were designed to avoid a narrow provincialism which used minor peculiarities
in foreign rights and laws as an excuse for imposing the policy of the forum.
Today the current danger is not intolerant insularity, but an isolation tolerat-
ing attacks on the basic concepts of our society.
Without deprecating their validity and importance in normal situations,
rules designed to promote security and uniformity may nevertheless be
qualified by the public policy of the forum. Recent years have shown that
security in property transactions, like all other security, ultimately rests on
acceptance by all nations of a minimum standard of conduct. By measuring
rights created by foreign states against forum policy, United States courts, it
would seem, would aid in preserving this minimum standard. The fact that
such action may occasionally give rise to uncertainty in property transactions
seems comparatively unimportant, for it will only arise as part of an attack on
a much greater threat to security.7 0
74. This problem seemed important to the court in Banco De Espana v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 444 (C.C.A.2d 1940), where the court said that the rule
" .. is not entirely a matter of comity... persons who dealt with the former Spanish
government are entitled to rely on the finality and legality of that government's
acts... .
75. 3 BEALE, op. cit. stpra note 2, at 1651; CzsHiarm, PmVATE I:.ER-ATzON*AL LAW
138-9 (2d ed. 1938); NuSBAUM, op. cit. stpra note 36, at 112-6; 3 BEAL, CAsss o:;
THE CoNFLICr OF LAws, 515, 517 (1902); Beach, Uniform Intcrstate Enforccment of
Vested Rights, 27 YALE L. J. 656 (1918); Goodrich, Foreign Facts and Local Fancies,
25 VA. L. Rav. 26 (1938); Nutting, op. cit. supra note 35; Cavers, A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. Rav. 173 (1933).
76. "So long as the basic rights of man are denied in any substantial portion of the
earth, men everywhere must live in fear of their own rights and their own security."
President Truman, speech at Monticello, July 4, 1947, reprinted in 17 D'VT STATE BUL.
80, 81 (1947). The short-run elevation of immediate security over long-run moral sta-
bility is evidenced in law journal comments during the appeasement years and Is ex-
emplified in reaction to United States' court's upholding of Nazi racial decrees in 1935.
See Notes, 23 VA. L. Rrv. 288 (1936), 24 VA. L. Rav. 922 (1937); Comment, 45 YA=-
L. J. 1463 (1936); 17 B. U. L. REv. 102 (1937). But see 38 Co. L. Ray. 1490 (1938)
for a comment properly realizing the policy considerations of the problem.
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CONCLUSION
The present time would appear to be highly propitious for abandoning the
doctrine of act of state immunity. There is increased recognition in many
quarters that each state must lend its powers to protect minimum basic rights
of foreign citizens77 from encroachment by their own governments. And the
suits of victims of German discriminatory law facilitate abandoning the doc-
trine since here the courts are granting immunity to the publicly disapproved
and officially condemned Nazi racial decrees.
Judge Hand's suggestion in the Bernstein case that act of state immunity
should be subject to control by official executive policy does not, of itself,
satisfy the objections to the rule. United States courts have a fundamental
duty of upholding basic public policy; the automatic judicial granting of im-
munity in the absence of executive policy is an abdication of this responsi-
bility. The granting of immunity constitutes support to acts of foreign states
and should be made in each case as a conscious policy decision.
When an official executive position regarding specific acts has been outlined,
or is received in the course of an action, it should be controlling. In the
absence of such indication, the traditional public policy of the forum should be
the guide. It is to be hoped that the Supreme Court will reverse the existing
rule and end the unpleasant spectacle of United States courts extending im-
munity to persecution and its profiteers.
77. President Truman, speech at Baylor University, March 6, 1947, Peace, Freedom
and World Trade, reprinted in 16 Dz,'T STATE BULL. 481 (1947) ; United States pro-
tests over curtailment of civil liberties in Bulgaria, 16 DEP'T STATE BULL. 1218 (1947) ;
same re Rumania, 17 id. at 38 (1947) ; Acheson, Requirements of Reeonsricton, 16
DEP'T STATE BULL. 991 (1947).
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